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REACTING TO A REGULATORY
INVESTIGATION INTO DERIVATIVES
MARKET ACTIVITY
Ira Lee "Ike" Sorkin*
S UPPOSE you are a senior officer at a public corporation, regis-
tered broker-dealer or registered commodities firm. You get up in
the morning and each day that you go to work you have the following
entities watching you to make sure you, your company or firm, and
the employees are complying with a myriad of rules, regulations and
statutes: The Department of Justice, the CFTC, the SEC, the various
self-regulatory organizations ("SRO's") such as The New York Stock
Exchange ("NYSE"), the NASD, and the National Futures Associa-
tion. Further, there are state securities commissions acting through
their respective state commissioners or state attorneys general. Then,
there are state and local prosecutors, some of whom, and I tell you
from experience, do not know the difference between a stock certifi-
cate and a parking ticket. To top it all off, there are the plaintiff class
action lawyers waiting to sue you and your company.
Derivatives present unique problems for these various layers of reg-
ulation. I am not sure I am too far off the mark when I say that peo-
ple who trade market derivatives often do not understand what they
are trading; entities and individuals that invest in derivatives often do
not understand what they are getting into; and regulators often do not
understand how derivatives work or what it is that must be regulated.
From my perspective, the biggest concern in the area of derivatives is
valuation. Valuation for net capital purposes, valuation for customer
statements and valuation for corporate balance sheets. How do you
put a value on the derivative? Who decides the actual value or better
said-the fair value of the derivative? What representations can you
make to the customer? Then there is the issue of supervision in both
the public corporation and registered entity. Who is supervising the
people who are involved in trading and valuing the derivatives? What
are the risk managers doing to make sure that problems do not arise
and if problems do surface, who is responsible for fixing the
problems? What does a corporation or firm do not only to institute
appropriate compliance procedures but to make sure those proce-
dures work effectively? Put another way: What are the systems that
need to be put in place? Who are the people who are managing these
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systems? Are they competent and do they understand what they are
supposed to do? You can be sure if there is a problem the regulators
are first going to address supervision or the lack thereof. In a few
moments, I will mention what I call preventive medicine.
I am often asked: How do prosecutors and regulators learn about
potential violative conduct? The answer is really quite simple. There
are generally six different sources from which prosecutors and regula-
tors obtain information leading to the commencement of an investiga-
tion. First, just like you and I, they read the newspapers and derive
information from reported court filings and stories related to the fi-
nancial markets. Second, the SROs such as the NYSE follow the trad-
ing in the securities listed on the NYSE looking for "spikes" and any
aberrations in trading activity. Third, the investing public files oral
and written complaints with the regulators by the tens of thousands,
the vast majority of which are inconsequential in nature and not worth
pursuing; others lead to very significant matters. Fourth, the regula-
tors to the extent possible, review public filings for any potential mis-
conduct. Fifth, informants, anonymous and disclosed, bring cases to
the attention of the regulators. Sixth, as in most so-called white-collar
cases, existing investigations, prosecutions, and civil actions often lead
to other cases. Investigations often commence by the service of a
grand jury subpoena issued by a prosecutor, a request by the SEC or
CFTC for the voluntary production of documents followed frequently
by a subpoena served pursuant to a Private Order of Investigation or
by a request for testimony by an SRO. Sometimes investigators acting
on behalf of prosecutors simply appear at the home of a perceived
vulnerable, but knowledgeable, employee of the entity for an inter-
view at night before the employee can discuss the matter with superi-
ors or the entity's counsel.
When a regulator or prosecutor commences an investigation, public
corporations and registered entities have to move very quickly. One
approach, of course, is to conduct an internal investigation. Find the
problem, isolate it, solve the problem and put in place procedures to
make sure the problem, does not recur. All that is good because the
regulators expect you to do that. Once an internal investigation is
commenced, however, numerous issues often must be addressed im-
mediately. For example: Who conducts the internal investigation?
In-house or outside counsel? What are the attorney-client privileges
that arise during the course of the investigation? Counsel clearly rep-
resents the entity, and not the employees; or, outside counsel may rep-
resent the outside directors or the audit committee but not the inside
board; and what approach should be followed if senior management
such as the CEO, President, and/or CFO may be culpable or at the
very least the subject or target of the grand jury?
As I just mentioned, frequently these issues must be addressed at
the commencement of the internal investigation but, even more fre-
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quently, counsel does not have enough information at the get go to
make those decisions. If an entity and its employees are under investi-
gation, the issue of who pays the legal fees of those individuals must
also be addressed. Prosecutors often frown upon a corporation paying
its employees' legal fees. They view the payment of legal fees as collu-
sion, conspiracy and even worse-a payoff to keep the individual's
mouth shut, notwithstanding the fact that the corporate by-laws or
statutes of the state where the corporation is incorporated may pro-
vide for the indemnification or advancement of legal fees. What does
one try to do in those instances where several prosecutors and regula-
tors all seek to commence separate enforcement proceedings against
your client? In the past, the civil regulators generally went first. They
would investigate the case, package the case after obtaining sanctions,
and then send it off to be reviewed to determine whether it should be
referred criminally. Today, we have parallel proceedings, with regula-
tors often at the federal, state and local level, all operating on separate
tracks heading for one place-charges against your client. Thus, at
any one time you might have a local state prosecutor investigating the
client, the Department of Justice on a parallel track with its own inves-
tigation, the CFTC and/or the SEC on another track, and the NASD
or the New York Stock Exchange also running on their own tracks.
What is one to do? Sometimes you try to go into court and stop one
or more of the regulators from doing what they are doing until the
criminal prosecution has run its course. There has been some very
limited success in recent years in doing that, but for the most part you
will be unsuccessful. At the end of the day, if you have a client who is
going to be charged, you try to work out what we call the global settle-
ment-one settlement with all the parties that are trying to get a piece
of your client-then hope that the plaintiff's class action lawyers go
away, which generally doesn't happen. Often a global settlement is
very difficult because each of the parties, whether it is the local prose-
cutor or an SRO, is looking for a "stat."
There are those who argue that there should not be an internal in-
vestigation or at least that no reports should be issued and no notes be
taken because written reports or notes are going to get out and wind
up in the hands of the regulators and plaintiff's class action lawyers.
The firm will never be able to protect itself. In fact, although there is
a corporate attorney-client privilege, the United States Attorney for
the Southern District of New York, while conceding that the govern-
ment recognizes the existence of the privilege, has stated unequivo-
cally that if you want to be a good corporate citizen you should waive
the privilege if you expect any benefit. Under this latter scenario, a
firm is in the untenable position of acting almost as an agent for the
prosecutor and inevitably all the regulators. Thus, you begin the in-
ternal investigation attempting to protect the corporation but at the
end of the day, turning over all you have done to the government.
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What is it then that you bring to the regulators when you start such an
investigation and assist the regulators? What you bring to the regula-
tors is the hope that if the entity has exposure, civilly or criminally,
your client, having acted as a good corporate citizen by bringing to the
regulator all the information that you gathered, can mitigate any po-
tential legal problems. You may not make the matter go away, but
you will mitigate your client's problem. There have been few corpora-
tions indicted since the organizational guidelines kicked in, in 1994,
but I fully expect that this is going to change in the next few years.
Let us talk for a moment about the sanctions that can be imposed if
and when a regulator determines that a brokerage firm or public cor-
poration should be charged. There was a time when the SEC would
seek an injunction and/or commence an administrative proceeding.
The SEC went to federal court and sought an order directing the vio-
lator not to engage again in violative conduct. In an administrative
proceeding the SEC might seek a censure, a suspension from the busi-
ness, a bar of the individual from associating with a registered entity
and/or a revocation of the entity's license. It was a much simpler pro-
cess in those days. Today, the civil regulators have far more weapons.
In addition to seeking injunctive relief and a bar from the business,
they might seek cease and desist orders, fines, penalties and disgorge-
ment. On the corporate side, there are injunctions against corpora-
tions, and bars against individuals being officers and directors of
public corporations. The civil regulator can also seek court-appointed
monitors to go into firms and not only monitor the brokerage firm or
corporation but with the blessing of the regulator require companies
to change their compliance procedures, accounting procedures, and/or
amend their filings. Moreover, the threat of prosecution today not
only comes from the federal prosecutors and federal regulators, but
also from state and local prosecutors. Witness in New York alone the
aggressiveness demonstrated recently by the District Attorney for
New York County in the indictment of a number of principals of the
brokerage firm of A.R. Baron & Co., not for violations of the United
States Code or the Securities Acts (over which the District Attorney
has no jurisdiction), but for violations of the New York State Penal
Laws. The aggressiveness of the local regulators is not limited to the
local prosecutors. State securities commissioners and the various
State Attorneys General have also recently exhibited a desire to pur-
sue the more traditional white-collar defendant, applying state crimi-
nal statutes to what has historically been the domain of the federal
government. Look what happened to Merrill Lynch: Merrill was on
the cusp of being indicted in the Orange County case, and that case
involved complex securities transactions that raised issues of suitabil-
ity, authorization, knowledge, and sophistication. There you had local




I close with reference to what I call preventive medicine. Preven-
tive medicine particularly in the derivatives area is crucial. What do I
mean by preventive medicine? Obviously you need good risk manag-
ers, you need people in your shops who understand whether you are
Procter & Gamble, Banker's Trust, or the proverbial widow or or-
phan. You have to know what you are selling, you have to know what
you are buying, and you need people to understand that. Clearly, if
you are the seller, if you are the party marketing the derivative, you
had better make sure that the people marketing the instrument under-
stand it and, as importantly, know the customer to whom they are
marketing this particular instrument and whether the customer under-
stands the instrument and it meets, within reason, the customer's in-
vestment objectives.
What else do you need? You need good compliance systems in
place that are managed by supervisors who, at every level, are aware
of the transaction not only when it is entered into but observing the
transaction as it goes through the process of working its way towards
conclusion. I mention supervisors again because supervision is a hot
topic with the civil regulators. You need guidelines for employees,
and the people who are involved in these transactions to understand
the guidelines and compliance involved in marketing and monitoring
these transactions. Putting all these things in place before the prob-
lem explodes is crucial in dealing with the potential liability that you
may face.
I will leave you with this one thought. I think the most dangerous
problem we face is regulation by enforcement. Until the regulators
fully understand these instruments-what they do; how they work;
who should be involved in them; and what the process is in terms of
educating the people who get involved with these instruments-until
that is done, I think regulation by enforcement will be a disaster.
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